Daisy Rowley v. Milford City et al : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Daisy Rowley v. Milford City et al : Brief of
Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sam Cline; Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton and Watkiss; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Rowley v. Milford City, No. 9182 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3565
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DAISY ROWLEY, 
Plaintiff, and Respondent, 
vs. 
F ll ED 
M~R 2 11960 
MILFORD CITY, a Municipal Cor-
poration of the State of Utah; R. L. 
KIZER as Mayor of Milford City; A. 
S. WHITTAKER, JOHN DAVIS, 
W. S. BOLTON, M. S. BOWN and 
J. N. WESTON, as City Councilmen 
of said Milford City; V. M. BURNS, 
as City Recorder of said Milford City; 
E L W 0 0 D JEFFERSON and 
ALENE JEFFERSON, his wife; 
and MIKE L. BRIMBERRY and 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................ 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................... 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS .................................................... 11 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying the motion of the· 
defendants praying for an order permitting them to 
serve and file their respective supplemental answers 
which set forth and plead an additional affirmative 
defense to the cause of action set forth in plaintiff's 
complaint .................................................................................. 11 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 19 
CASES CITED 
Bracken vs. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 Pac. 16 ----------------------16 
Jensen vs. Dorr, 116 Pac. 553 (Cal) ···············--·-······----------- 17 
Story Gold Dredging Co. vs. Wilson, 76 Pac. (2nd) 
73, (Mont.) ········-················-····················-----··-·······-····--··-···-··· 17 
United States vs. L. D. Caulk Co., (U.S.D.C.-Delaware) 
114 Fed. Supp. 939 ······························--···············-····-·······---- 18 
Wells vs. Wells, 2 Utah (2nd) 241, 272 Pac. (2nd) 167 ...... 16 
STATUTES CITED 
Sec. 10-6-12, U.C.A. 1953 ··-·········-------···---------------···········--·-········ 12 
Sec. 20-11-24, U.C.A. 1953 ···-···-··········-·····--····-······--·--·····-····-····· 11 
Sec. 104-13-13, U.C.A. 1943 ........................................................ 15 
RULES CITED 
Rule 15(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ........................ 15 
Rule 15(d) Federal Rules ············--··-·········-······-····-····-···-···-·······- 15 
TEXTS CITED 
Sec. 455, Page 945, Vol. 1, Barron & Holtzoff Federal 
Practice and Procedure ........................................................ 16 
Sec. 455, Page 947, Vol. 1, Barron & Holtzoff Federal 
Practice and Procedure ·················-··-··--------------------------------- 16 
Sec. 328, Pages 725-6-7, Vol. 71, C.J.S. -----------------------·----···- 17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
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KIZER as Mayor of Milford City; A .. 
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W. S. BOLTON, M. S. BOWN and 
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DOROTHY BRIMBERRY, his wife; 
FIRST DOE, SECOND DOE and 
THIRD DOE, 
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Defendants. and Appe~ l.ants" 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEl\fENT OF THE CASE 
This cause is before this Court as an intermediate 
appeal from an order made and entered in the above 
cause by the Fifth District Court of the State of Utah, 
in and for Beaver County, denying the motion of the de-
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2 
fendants praying for an order permitting them to serve 
and file their respective supplemental answers setting 
forth and pleading an additional affirmative defense to 
the cause of action set forth in plantiff's complaint, and 
which supplemental answers would allege occurrences 
and events which have happened since the date of the 
answers of said defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this cause and on or about the 23rd day of Jan-
uary, 1959, a complaint was filed in the District Court 
of Beaver County, Utah, being Civil No. 2930 (Tr. 3 to 
10), which alleged in addition to the residence of the 
plaintiff, the existence of 1\1ilford City as a municipal 
corporation and the official positions of the other de-
fendants, in substance as follows: 
(a) That on the 1st day of July, 1935, the city pur-
chased a1;1.d acquired f9r the use and benefit of the in-
habitants thereof certain described lands, consisting of 
approximately five acres. 
(b) That prior to 1\1arch, 1939, the city dedicated 
the premises as a public park and playground called the 
South Park; and set the same apart as a public park 
and playground, and that down to the present time the 
land. has been dedicated and used as such. 
(c) That about the year 1939 the city held a special 
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bond election for the pu.rpose of raising the sum of 
$3500.00 to improve the premises ; that the taxpayers 
voted in favor of bonding the city; that $3500.00 was 
borrowed and used for such purposes ; that representa-
tions were made to the U. S. Works Progress Adminis-
tration that the lands were. and had been so dedicated 
and used, and that such amount was used for the im-
provement of the lands. 
(d) That at a purported special meeting of the city 
council at which the J\iayor and four councilmen were 
present, but at which meeting Councilman Bolton was 
not present, a purported sale of a portion of said prop-
erty was made to the defendants Jefferson and Brim-
berry for a consideration of $2500.00; that two of the 
councilmen voted in favor of such sale and two voted 
against it and that the Mayor cast his vote in favor of' 
said sale. (The portion so sold consisted of. a tract 225 
feet by 75 feet, or 0.39 of an acre). 
(e) That on the 27th day of December, 1958, the 
l\Iayor and City Recorder executed a quit-claim deed to 
the purchasers. 
(f) That at a regular n1eeting of the Council held 
on Dec. 1st, 1958, the plaintiff and other citizens and 
taxpayers protested the sale, contending that they con-
sidered the sale illegal and void; that at such meeting 
the City Recorder was directed to notify the purchasers 
to hold up work on the property, and that the purchasers 
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4 
have at all times since Dec. 2nd, 1958, had notice and 
1 
knowledge that the legality of the sale was in question. 
(g) Plaintiff alleged that the sale was illegal and 
void and the deed did not constitute a valid conveyance; 
that the special meeting held on Nov. 21, 1958, was not 
a legal meeting because no notice thereof was given to 
the councilman not present at the meeting; that the prop-
erty had been and was dedicated as and used as a park 
and playground; that those voting for the sale abused 
their discretion in making the sale for a grossly inade--
quate consideration, and without soliciting for other 
offers or allowng other prospective bidders to make a 
bid, and that two councilmen were influenced "by con-
sideration of their employment by one of said purported 
purchasers, or n1embers of his immediate family to make 
said sale for a grossly inadequate consideration.'' 
(h) That the property covered by the sale is needed 
by the city and its citizens for park purposes. 
( i) That since Nov. 21, 1958, the purchasers have 
built certain stntctures upon the lands included in the 
deed, to-wit: motel units and buildings, which structures 
interfere with the use of the premises for park and park-
ing purposes. 
(j) That prayer asks that the city be adjudged the 
owner of the premises; that the sale be declared as il-
legal and void; and for a decree requiring the purchas· 
ers to remove all structures placed thereon by them. 
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The answer of' the City and its officers (Tr. 11 to 
15), admits the city's purchase of the five acre tract in 
1935, and the bond election in 1939 for the purpose of 
raising funds to improve the same, but deny that the 
premises conveyed to Jefferson and Brimberry were in-
cluded within or formed a part of the South Park; al-
leged that the special meeting was regularly called and 
conducted, and that the conveyance was in all respects 
regular and the deed was issued after the consideration 
of $2500.00 had been paid by purchasers. 
The answer pleads affirmatively that from the time 
of the purchase of the five acre tract portions have been 
improved and used as a public park, portions were for· 
mally dedicated for use as public streets and that the 
greatest portion thereof has been and is devoted to a 
public use, but that small portions thereof, immediately 
after its acquisition by the city and at various intervals 
thereafter were by various city councils deemed un-
necessary for public use, and not having been so dedi· 
cated, were disposed of to various individuals and org-an-
izations; that a portion of the premises conveyed to J ef-
ferson and Brin1berry was never a part of said five acre 
tract and was never used as a park or any other public 
use, and that a portion of the premises so conveyed had 
not for many years been used by the city as a park. 
As a further defense it '\Yas alleged that the city 
council received an offer of $2500.00 in cash for the 
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thoroughly discussed and considered; that it was by a 
majority of the council present at the meeting deemed 
for the best interests of the city that the premises be 
sold and used by the purchaser for the purpose of mak-
ing valuable improvements thereon, putting the prem-
ises on the tax rolls and bringing new and valuable bus-
iness into the city; that it was considered by the council 
that a sufficient area remained for use as a park and 
that the area left, in connection ·with other large tracts 
of land used exclusively as public parks and improved 
by lawns, trees and other improvements was more than 
sufficient for the needs of the citizens; that the price of 
$2500.00 offered was a fair and equitable price and that 
the city was receiving full value therefor; that the 
plaintiff and others appeared before the council after 
such sale and objected to the sale for the reason it was 
claimed the special meeting was not regularly called and 
proper notice thereof giYen, and for the further reason 
it was claimed the city was legally obligated to adver-
tise the property for sale or to submit such sale to bids 
or accept the highest hid. 
The defendants Jefferson and Brimberry filed their 
answer (Tr. 16 to 20), admitting and d~~nying· allegations 
of the complaint and affirmatiYely r: leading substan-
tially as set forth in the city's answer.· and in addition 
thereto pleaded that immediately afte1 the acceptance 
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of their offer they took possession of the premises and 
commenced making improvements thereon and made def-
inite commitments for the purchase of materials to be 
used in the construction of a modern motel and auto 
court and obligated themselves for the payment of sub-
stantial sums for said materials; that between the ac-
ceptance of their offer and the time when they were 
served with summons in this cause they made valuable 
improvements upon the premises and expended substan-
tial amounts of money for the same and thereafter and 
up to and including the time of filing their answer they 
had almost completed the building of a modern and val-
uable auto court and motel; that they were never ad-
vised by the city council that the sale of the premises 
would be considered as illegal or void; that the council 
had never attempted to rescind the sale or return the 
moneys paid for the premises. 
Upon such pleadings this cause was tried before 
Judge Will L. Hoyt, Judge of the Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict, commencing October 22nd, 1959. 
At the conclusion of the trial and during the oral 
argument presented to the trial court, the court indicat-
ed strongly that he considered the premises conveyed to 
Jefferson and Brimberry were a part of public grounds, 
and expressed the opinion that the council had no legal 
right to dispose of the property because Sec. 10-8-8 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides a city council may va-
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cate public parks and grounds by ordinance and there 
was no proof that an ordinance vacating the premises 
in question had ever been enacted. The court then took 
the case under advisement. 
On Nov. 2nd, 1959, and before the trial court an-
nounced a decision in the case, the Milford City Council 
duly and regularly passed its Ordinance No. 96 (Tr. 26 
to 28), ordaining that portions of the five acre tract 
(called the Campbell Millsite) be declared to be vacated 
as any part or portion of any public park or public 
grounds of Milford, and from and after the effective 
date of the ordinance should no longer be open to the 
public as a public park or public grounds or be consid-
ered as a part thereof. Described in the ordinance was 
not only the premises theretofore conveyed to Jefferson 
and Brimberry, but also several other tracts theretofore 
conveyed to other individuals and organizations. A copy 
of the ordinance is attached as an exhibit to the proposed 
supplemental answers. 
A day or bvo after the enactment of the above or-
dinance the defendant city and its officials, and the de-
fendants Jefferson and Brimberry, prepared their sep-
arate supplemental answers alleging the following addi-
tional acts which, took place and happened since the fil-
ing of the first answers, and which took place prior to 
any determination of said cause by the trial court and 
which acts constitute an additional affirmative defense 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
to the cause of action pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, 
to-wit: 
(a) That on November 2nd, 1959, at a regular ses-
sion of the Milford City Council, at which time were 
present the Mayor, all City Councilmen and City Re-
corder, the council by a majority vote approved and 
passed Ordinance No. 96, vacating portions of the prem-
ises within the said Campbell Millsite sometimes known 
as the South Park, and including the premises described 
in plaintiff's complaint; 
(b) That the City Council at said meeting and after 
the approval and passage of said ordinance, ordered it 
published immediately; and that the ordinance was pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation and pub-
lished within Milford City in the issue of and on Nov. 
5, 1959. 
(c) That the said ordinance would, under the stat~ 
utes of Utah become effective on the 30th day after its 
publication, to-wit: on the 6th day of December, 1959, 
unless the legal voters of l\lilford City should require 
such Ordinance No. 96 to be submitted to the voters 
thereof as required and provided by Title 20, Chapter 
11, U.C.A. 1953, in ·which latter event the effective date 
of such ordinance would be stayed until the outcome of 
the election. 
(d) That in the event the ordinance should becon1e 
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effective on Dec. 6th, 1959, or by an affirmative vote in 
the event of a referendum, the vacation of the premises 
as a public park (should the court determine the prem-
ises have been and are a portion of a public park) will 
then be subject to the disposition thereof as theretofore 
made by said city council or subject to such disposition 
as the council might then determine or be required to 
make. 
(e) The supplemental answers then prayed that the 
defendants be permitted to assert the above additional 
affirmative defense; that the trial of the cause. be re-
opened and the defendants permitted to submit proof of 
the facts therein pleaded; and that further proceedings 
be stayed until such further hearing; and in the event 
upon such further hearing defendants have submitted 
good and sufficient proof of the facts so pleaded by 
them that further proceedings then be stayed until either 
the ordinance should bec01ne effective, or in case of a 
referendum and negative vote thereon said ordinance 
is not permitted to become effective (Tr. 29-40). 
On Nov. 9th, 1959, a motion was then filed by the 
defendants, supported by an affidavit of the City Re-
corder reciting the passag·e and publication of said Ordi-
nance, moving the court for an order permitting the de-
fendants to file and serve their respective supplemental 
answers, a copy of which proposed supplemental answers 
were attached to the motion (Tr. 21 to 28); and on Nov. 
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30th, 1959, the trial court denied such motion (Tr. 41). 
A petition for interlocutory appeal from said order 
was filed in accordance with and as provided h,y the 
Utah Rules of Civil Proeedure; and whieh appeal was 
duly allowed and granted by order of this Court (Tr. 
42). 
STATE1\1:ENT OF POINTS 
The trial court erred in denying the motion of the 
defendants praying for an order permitting them to 
serve and file their respective supplemental answers 
which set forth and pleaded an additional affirmative 
defense to the cause of action set forth in plaintiff's 
complaint. 
ARGUNIENT 
Sec. 20-11-24, U.C.A. 1953, provides that referendum 
petitions against any ordinance, franchise or resolution 
passed by the governing body of a city or town shall be 
filed with the clerk or recorder within thirty days after 
the passage of such ordinance, resolution or franchise. 
The time within which a referendum petition against 
Ordinance No. 96, vacating the premises in question, 
should be filed in order to submit the same to a vote, 
expired on Dec. 6th, 1959. 
While not sho·wn by the record on this appeal, it 
can be stated and certainly will not be disputed, that 
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neither plaintiff nor anyone else presented a petition 
to the City Recorder within sucli thirty day period (or 
thereafter) asking for a referendum, and therefore un-
der Sec. 10-6-12, U.C.A. 1953, the ordinance became ef-
fective on that date. 
There now exists a valid and subsisting ordinance 
vacating the premises which plaintiff contends in her 
complaint are a part of a public park. The supplemental 
answers of the defendants in addition to pleading the 
passage, approval and publication of the ordinance, 
prayed that the cause be reopened and the defendants 
be permitted to submit proof of such facts, and if upon 
a further hearing they have submitted good and suffi-
cient proof of such facts, further proceedings then be 
stayed until the ordinance either should become effective 
or in the event of a referendum and negative vote there-
on it is not permitted to become effective. If the ordi-
dance became effectiYe the city would then be in a posi-
tion to convey the premises to the defendants Jefferson 
and Brimberry, and if done in a legal manner, that is, at 
a regular or legally called meeting and by the affirma-
tive vote and action of a majority of the council, such 
action would overcome the trial court's indicated pos-
sible determination that the premises were a part of a 
public park and not subject to being vacated excepting 
by ordinance. 
We do not oYer look the fact that the complaint al .. 
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leges the sale was made at an alleged special meeting 
and that such meeting was void. "\V e do not overlook 
the fact the complaint alleges that two councilmen who 
voted for the sale were improperly influenced so to do. 
vVhile appellants have denied these allegations the prop-
ositions become moot with the subsequent action of the 
council in enacting the ordinance vacating the premises 
at a regular and stated meeting and by a majority vote 
of the five councilmen. The trial court cannot know, 
without permitting the supplemental answers to be filed 
and a further hearing had upon the matters therein al-
leged that the .same two councilmen who allegedly were 
improperly influenced were the same two councilmen 
who voted against the enactment of the ordinance, or 
whether improper influence would still be claimed con-
cerning the councilmen who later voted in favor of the 
passage of the ordinance. 
~IoreoYer, if the supplemental answers were permit-
ted to be filed and a further hearing held upon the issues 
therein raised, it can be said with certainty the proof at 
that time will show no referendum ag·ainst the ordinance 
and that it has now become effective, and that the coun-
cil within its discretion and with on undisputed right so 
to do, has either reconYeyed the premises to the defend-
ants Jefferson and Brimberry, or has a legal right so 
to do. Actually, practically all, if not all of the issues 
presented to the trial court at the trial would be nwot. 
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We are not unmindful of the fact the respondent 
alleges in her complaint that the sale is illegal in that 
the consideration was grossly inadequate, and without 
either soliciting for other offers or allowing other pros-
pective bidders to make a bid. Upon a further hearing 
and under subsequent action of the city council even 
those issues conceivably would not be in controversy, 
but if so, they present a legal problem as to whether a 
city council is required to advertise its intention to make 
a sale and ·solicit bids, or even to sell to the highest bid-
der. A determination of these questions is not before 
this Court upon this intermediate appeal. 
The complaint prays for an order or decree, or-
dering and requiring the defendants Jefferson and Brim-
berry to forthwith remove all structures they have placed 
on the premises. The evidence at the trial shows im-
provements placed upon the premises costing and of the 
value of approximately $60,000.00. If the trial court 
should conclude and decree on the present ·pleadings and 
evidence that such relief should be granted plaintiff, the 
defendants could be required to comply therewith and de-
molish and remove such valuable illl:provements before a 
subsequent action pleading the facts now set forth in the 
supplemental answers could be brought to issue and 
tried. 
There can be no question but that the facts pleaded 
in said supplemental answers embrace other and fur-
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ther defenses which arose after the original answers 
were filed and since the trial of this cause, and which 
relate very definitely to the plaintiff's claim for relief. 
Prior to the adoption of the present Utah Rules of 
CiYil Procedure and for many years the Utah Code of 
Civil Procedure provided for the making of supplement-
al pleadings alleging facts material to the case and which 
have happened after the filing of the former pleading. 
Sec. 104-13-13 U.C.A. 1943, provided: Either 
party may be allowed to make a supplemental com-
plaint, answer or reply, alleging facts material to 
the case, which have happened or have come to 
his knowledge after the filing of the former plead-
lng. 
R'Ule 15{ d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
now provides as follows: Upon motion of a party 
the Court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a sup-
plemental pleading setting forth transactions or 
occurrences or events which have happened since 
the date of the pleading sought to he supplement-
ed. If the court deems it advisable that the ad-
verse party plead thereto, it shall so order, speci-
fying the time therefor. 
This rule is taken verbatim from Rule 15{ d) of the 
Federal Rules : 
A supplemental answer should be allowed to 
be filed only when the matter to be set forth em-
braces other and further defenses which arose 
after the original answer was filed and which re-
late to the plaintiff's claim for relief stated in the 
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original complaint. Sec. 455, page 945, Vol. 1, Bar-
ron and H oltzoff Federal Practice and Proced'ltre. 
A supplemental pleading may not be served 
as a matter of course without leave of the Court. 
Whether permission to file it should he granted or 
refused is a 'matter resting in the sound discretion 
of the district court. In the exercise of such dis-
CJ;~tion .the courts are inclined toward the liberal 
a1loi-vance of supplemental pleadings. Page 947, 
supra. 
C01nplaint in contract action brought prema-
turely, before final payment thereunder was due, 
may he cured hy supplemental complaint. Bracken 
vs Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 Pac. 16. 
The amendment was made to conform to the 
evidence and a new issue was such as could con-
veniently and effectively he handled to settle an 
entire controversy in the furtherance of justice 
without injury to substantive rights. Wells vs. 
Wells, 2 Utah (2nd) 241, 272 Pac. (2nd) 167, at 
page 170. 
The consent of the adverse party or leave of 
court must he had in order to file a supplemental 
pleading, and the granting or refusal of such leave 
is a matter largely within the discretion of the 
court. Such discretion is not arbitrary, but is ju-
dicial in character, and must be exercised reason-
ably, and not capriciously or wilfully; and on good 
cause shown, the court cannot refuse to allow a 
supplemental pleading without an abuse of its dis-
cretion. Altho leave to file a supplemental plead-
ing may be refused where the new matter offered 
is clearly frivolous or inequitable in its nature or 
where the new matter sought to be introduced will 
be plainly inadmissible at the trial, it has been 
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held that it should be granted, almost as a matter 
of course, in the interest of justice and for the 
protection of the party's rights and that an appli-
cation for such leave is granted almost as a mat-
ter of course where the other party cannot be in-
jured or prejudiced thereby or where the facts oc-
curring after the service of the original complaint 
entitle complainant to more extensive relief. Sec. 
328, pages 725-6, Vol. ,71, CJS. 
In the absence of statutory provision to the 
contrary, a supplemental pleading may be allowed 
after judgment as well as before, and where cir-
cumstances warrant the opening of a decree or 
judgment, such pleading is necessary to present 
the new issues to be litigated. Pages 726-7, 71 CJS. 
The proper method of pleading a fact material 
to the cause occurring after the filing of a former 
pleading by a party is by way of a supplemental 
pleading. The right to file a supplemental plead-
ing is not as of right, but the application to file 
such a pleading is addressed to the discretion of 
the trial court. * * * The effect of the termination 
of this contract "\Vas material, but the method of 
incorporating it in the pleadings was irregular. It 
U)O~tld have been an abuse of discretion if applica-
tion had been made to file a supplemental com-
plaint containing allegations of this fact, to deny 
it. (Italics ours). Story Gol'd Dredging Co. vs .. 
Wilson, 76 Pac. (2nd) 73, at page 76. 
I 
It is an abuse of discretion to refuse leave to 
a defendant to set up by supplemental answer a 
bankruptcy discharge obtained subsequent to the 
commencement of the action as a bar to any per-
sonal judgment, where proper application is made 
therefor within a reasonable time. Jensen vs .Dorr, 
116 Pac. 553. 
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In the, case of United States vs. L. D. Caulk 
Company (U.S.D.C.- Delaware) 114 Fed. Supp. 939, 
the defendant sought leave under Federal Rule 15d 
to file a supplemental answer setting forth mat-
ters occurring subsequent to filing of the original 
answer and which, it was contended, would render 
- moot the matters complained of in plaintiff's com-
plaint. In permitting the supplemental answer to 
be filed, the Court said : 
'In this way, prior to the actual determi-
nation of the liability of the defendant, such 
defendant will be given an opportunity to es-
tablish a basis for its contention that the sub-
sequent allegedly purging action has made any 
original action moot. Without the supplement-
al answer, it is difficult to see how this ques-
tion can be raised. The defendant should have 
the opportunity to present the question***.' 
Based upon statutes, rules, and authorities above 
cited and upon all sound reason, we submit that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the fil-
ing of the supplemental answers containing allegations 
which, if proved, would (a) render moot almost every 
leg·al claim raised by plaintiff's complaint, (b) effective-
ly dispose of the entire controversy, (c) prevent possible 
irreparable injury to the defendants, Jefferson and 
Brimberry, and (d) prevent a n1ultiplicity of actions. 
Particularly is this true by reason of the fact that no 
prejudice could possibly result to any legitimate interest 
of the plaintiff by permitting the supplemental pleadings 
to be filed. 
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CO~CL1JSION 
There is involved in the denial of the defendants' 
motion for leave to file the supplemental answers sub-
stantial rights of said defendants and which rights are 
materially affected because if the within cause proceeds 
to a decision and decree under the present pleadings and 
if it be held and decreed the plaintiff be awarded all of 
the relief prayed for, then a subsequent action will be 
required to stay the execution of such decree until the 
validity of said ordinance together with the rights of 
the defendants thereunder can be determined. 
All of the defendants submit it is in the interest and 
furtherance of equity and justice that the action of the 
trial court in denying the motion for an order permitting 
them to serve and file their respective proposed supple-
mental answers be reversed. 
Respectfully Sub,mitted, 
SAM CLINE, 
Attorney for Appellants 
.ZJ! ilford City and its Officers 
ZAR E. HAYES, 
of the firm of Pugsley, Hayes, 
Ra1npton and W at kiss 
SAM CLINE, 
AttorneYjfor Appellants 
Jefferson and Brimberry. 
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